(Published in The Pioneer on November 1, 2010)
Rajesh Singh
“I was elected as an MLA on BJP ticket. I being an MLA of the BJP got disillusioned with the functioning of the Government headed by Shri B S Yeddyurappa. There have been widespread corruption, nepotism, favouritism, abuse of power, misusing of government machinery in the functioning of the government headed by Shri B S Yeddyurappa and a situation has arisen that the governance of the state cannot be carried on in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution…I hereby withdraw my support to the government headed by Shri B S Yeddyurappa. I request you to intervene and institute the constitutional process as constitutional head of the State”.
These lines, written by 11 rebel legislators of the BJP as part of separate letters to Governor H R Bhadwaj, were supposed to bring the Yeddyurappa government crumbling down. Instead, they ended up sealing the fate of their authors. The letters eventually proved to be the most damning evidence before the Karnataka High Court that the rebels had defected from the party they were elected as legislators, and thus attracted the provisions of the Tenth Schedule of the Constitution. Indeed, it is now evident that even if the rebels had done nothing else after submitting the letters to the Governor – though they did do a lot more thereafter, like being closeted for several days with Congress and JD(S) leaders in resorts outside the state and plotting the government’s downfall, none of which helped their cause – they would still have been a fit case for disqualification. Because, what the rebels had been led by their handlers to believe was a master stroke turned out to be in fact a foolish and suicidal move.
The rebels were secure in the belief that their actions would at most amount to dissent, but could never qualify as defection as they had done nothing to attract the provisions of the anti-defection laws. Here, they sought relief in Para 2 (1) (a) of the Tenth Schedule of the Constitution that deals with defection by parliamentarians or legislators by voluntarily giving up membership of a party on whose symbol they have been elected. It reads: “…a member of a House belonging to any political party shall be disqualified for being a member of the House – if he voluntarily gives up his membership of such political party”.
This explains why the rebels insisted all throughout – and do so even now, anticipating a battle in the Supreme Court – that they had not voluntarily given up membership of the BJP and that they continued to be in the party. It is as part of this strategy that they recently told the media that they would like to thrash out the issue with “our party president Nitin Gadkari”. They banked on the premise that they had not submitted any letter of resignation to the party that would amount to be voluntarily surrendering membership. But that ploy has failed to work, at least until now. Justice V G Sabhahit, the ‘third’ judge called upon to settle the issue after an earlier two-judge bench gave a split verdict, noted in his ruling that voluntarily giving up membership did not necessarily mean that the legislators had to “expressly submit their resignation, as the fact of voluntarily giving up membership may be express or implied”.
And so, what got implied were the letters the rebels had written to the Governor. Justice Sabhahit referred to them and said the rebels were liable to get disqualified ‘on the basis of the letters dated October 6, 2010”. In a scathing observation that ripped through the rebels’ defence, the judge noted that the letters called for the Governor’s intervention in changing the Chief Minister, which the Governor had no powers to do. What the Governor could do though was to intervene through Article 356 of the Constitution that provided for imposition of President’s Rule. Since that could happen if the elected government were to be dismissed, in effect the rebels were seeking the dismissal of a government led by a party on whose name they had been elected to the House.
Referring to the rebels’ letter to the Governor for change of Chief Minister, Justice Sabhahit said, “The Governor has no power to direct legislative party to change the Chief Minister. Though the contents of the letter would show that the petitioners were disillusioned by the conduct of Shri Yeddyurappa as Chief Minister… the averment made in the letter would clearly show that it is in consonance with the wordings of Article 356”.
Holding the contents of the letter as “voluntary and unequivocal”, Justice Sabhahit said the conduct of the authors of the letter (s) “is incompatible with the contention (of the rebels) that they still continue to be members of the Bharatiya Janata Party and the said conduct would only lead to the inference that the petitioners (rebels) have incurred disqualification under Para 2 (1) (a) of the Tenth Schedule”.
The fact that the ‘conduct’ of rebels indicates whether they have voluntarily relinquished the membership of their party, even if they have not formally submitted their resignations, was recognized by Karnataka High Court Chief Justice J S Khehar in his October 18 verdict in the case. Chief Justice Khehar was a member of the two-judge bench that gave the split verdict, and had upheld the disqualification on grounds similar to what Justice Sabhahit was to later agree upon. Both the Chief Justice and Justice Sabhahit concurred that (1) voluntarily giving up membership can also be implied (2) the contents of the letter were voluntary and unequivocal (3) the letter to the Governor was in itself a fit case for disqualification.
Chief Justice Khehar said an elected legislator could demand a change in the leadership of his party’s government contrary to the collective wisdom of his political party only at the risk of voluntarily giving up membership of that party. Therefore, “the letter dated October 6, 2010, addressed by the petitioners (rebel legislators) to the Governor, was by itself sufficient to conclude that the petitioners had suffered the disqualification under Para 2 (1) (a) of the Tenth Schedule of the Constitution of India”.
Both the learned judges were, of course, on track with an earlier Supreme Court verdict in Swami Prasad Maurya versus Rajendra Singh Rana & Others case, that enhanced the scope of the provisions mentioned above, and brought it on a par with not only the aspirations of the people but also the spirit of the Tenth Schedule. Upholding the disqualification of 37 BSP legislators in Uttar Pradesh who had written to the Governor, the apex court judges had said, “A person may voluntarily give up his membership of an original party even though he has not tendered his resignation from the membership of that party. Even in the absence of a formal resignation, an inference can be drawn from the conduct of a member that he has voluntarily given up his membership of the political party to which he belongs”.
And, in words that were pronounced some two years ago and have found an echo in the Karnataka case, the apex court judges added, “The Act of giving a (rebellious) letter to the Governor … itself would amount to an act of voluntarily giving up the membership of the party on whose ticket the said members had got elected”. It’s the letter, thus, that did the 11 rebels in.
Monday, November 1, 2010
Tigers hit by questionable eco-development

(Published in The Pioneer on November 1, 2010)
Rajesh Singh
Sometime this November, the Government is expected to release the new tiger population figure. With the apprehension that it could be lower than the currently adopted official number of 1,411 tigers — in itself arrived at following an estimation way back in 2006-07 by the Wildlife Institute of India — experts believe the official campaign to save the striped cats has been hit in recent years.
This is primarily due to a shift in focus from habitat recovery and strengthening ground protection forces to questionable eco-development activities within the forest areas.
Except in the first few years after the Central Government launched Project Tiger in the early 70s, when the tiger number went up to more than 3,000 from a low of 1,200 or so, the tiger population has consistently plunged despite various efforts taken to address the issue. Either these measures proved inadequate, failed to sustain or were misdirected.
K Ullas Karanth, one of the country’s most respected wildlife conservationists and director of the Bangalore-based Centre for Wildlife Studies, is concerned by the enormous “expenditure-oriented activities within the Forest Department” that has been harming tiger conservation.
He told The Pioneer, “Tiger conservation has floundered because of a mission-drift away from focus on ground protection and habitat recovery, towards eco-development and other expenditure-oriented activities within the Forest Department.”
Also a senior conservation scientist with the Wildlife Conversation Society, New York and pioneer of the camera trap method that more accurately counts tigers, Karanth strongly advocated the need to re-fix priorities. “Abandon expenditure-oriented activities such as eco-development and bring back focused protection,” he said.
One of the biggest hurdles in creating safe havens for these big cats to flourish has been the slow relocation of human settlements away from tiger habitats, a process that has been mired in controversy over allegations of favouritism and low compensations. “In my opinion, the Governments (Central and State) should promote fair and generous voluntary relocation of human settlements away from tiger habitats,” he said.
The role of State Governments was paramount in saving tigers, he pointed out and added that non-compliance with Central directives had been among the causes for a less-than-satisfactory tiger conservation record.
In that context, he said a recent suggestion to bifurcate Forests & Wildlife Department from the Environment Department, while welcome, would not directly address the issue. Karanth said, “I agree it would be helpful to have this but primarily conservation actions are implemented by State Governments. This separation does not address their lack of interest or non-compliance with Central directives.”
Wildlife filmmaker and conservationist Shekar Dattatri too believes the delay in the proposed bifurcation is not the problem since it has nothing to do directly with tiger conservation. He said, “The decision to create two departments within the Ministry of Environment & Forests came about thanks to a plea made to the Prime Minister by conservationist Valmik Thapar during a meeting of the National Board for Wildlife in mid-2010. The delay in implementing it is not the cause for the problems in tiger reserves.”
The real problems lay elsewhere, he stated, pointing to the unchecked ‘developmental’ activities within forest areas, including tiger habitats. Also a former member of the National Board for Wildlife, Dattatri told The Pioneer that national park managers had turned into some sort of civil contractors.
“The main priority and preoccupation of most park managers today is not protection but lucrative civil works, such as making more forest roads, building culverts, watchtowers, renovating resthouses, digging rainwater harvesting ditches, weed eradication and creating more waterholes. Despite all the hype surrounding tigers, it is business as usual on ground, with little being done to benefit tiger conservation,” he noted.
Much of these occupations, he added, were entirely unnecessary and drained public funds. Most importantly, as he pointed out in a short film ‘Truth about Tigers’ — which he made and distributed on a CD — these works disturbed tigers and affected their conservation.
Dattatri was emphatic that “no money should be released for frivolous construction or unscientific habitat manipulation activities. All resources should be focused on strengthening the protection mechanism and relocation of villages where necessary”.
Ruing that relocation of villages from tiger reserves was moving at a glacial pace, “even in instances where villagers themselves are vigorously demanding to be resettled”, he said the stakeholders, including State Governments, should move swiftly to promote relocation of human settlements away from tiger habitats.
The involvement of State Governments is crucial, for instance, in creating buffer zones to protect wildlife from human conflicts and activities that endanger the reserves. According to a report, more than 25 of the 39 reserves do not have the buffer areas, simply because State Governments have not notified them for fear of losing out on various dubious ‘developmental’ activities that could fetch them revenue from those regions.
Upset that “plenty has gone wrong” in tiger conservation over recent years, Dattatri said several of the big cat reserves suffered from poor leadership and shortage of frontline field staff.
“Anti-poaching watchers are usually employed as daily wagers but their wages are often not paid for months. Field staff lack even basic training and equipment. Senior officers in many parks do not go to the field regularly and are out of touch with ground realities,” he added.
Dattatri said protection-oriented officials should be posted at reserves with freedom to perform “without fear or favour” and people from local tribal communities should be appointed for anti-poaching work and compensated adequately and promptly.
Monday, October 25, 2010
Karnataka Speaker was fair & unprejudiced: 2 judge High Court Bench
(First appeared in The Pioneer dated October 22)
RAJESH SINGH
While the two Karnataka High Court judges who heard on October 18 the plea of the 11 state legislators disqualified by the Speaker under the anti-defection laws, differed on upholding the disqualification, they were unanimous in endorsing the Speaker on three significant grounds. One, the Speaker demonstrated no prejudice in passing the disqualification order; two, he had followed the principles of natural justice in arriving at the decision; and three, he had committed no procedural lapses in reaching his conclusion. These observations have effectively demolished the claims of dissident legislators that the Speaker was biased and had failed to comply with accepted procedures in ordering their disqualification.
What now remains to be settled is whether the conduct of these BJP legislators – dashing off a letter to the Governor withdrawing support to Chief Minister BS Yeddyurappa and openly hobnobbing with the opposition Congress and the JD (S) for several days – was sufficient reason for the Speaker to disqualify them under the 10th Schedule of the Constitution. Because one of the two judges, Chief Justice J S Khehar, found them so while Justice N Kumar did not concur with the opinion, a third judge is now engaged in deciding the matter. But, regardless of the outcome the fact will remain that the majority opinion has upheld the Speaker’s conduct in processing the case.
Dismissing charges of prejudice levelled by the disqualified legislators against the Speaker who gave them ‘just’ three days to respond to a show cause notice, Chief Justice Khehar (supported by Justice Kumar) pointed out that “although three days time was afforded to the petitioners to respond to the show cause notice, the petitioners filed detailed and exhaustive replies dealing not only with the factual aspect of the matter, but also of the nuances of the law involved in the controversy”. The inference is that, while the complainants quibbled over lack of adequate time to submit their defence, their replies, including “nuances” of the law that they quoted, did not show any suffering on this count.
It is clear from the court’s observations that the disqualified legislators worsened their case by not even disputing the findings of the Speaker – for example, having met the Governor and given him a letter withdrawing support to their party colleague and Chief Minister – that was there in the show cause notice and proved pivotal to their disqualification. The High Court said, “The factual position depicted in the (Speaker’s) order, has not been disputed by the petitioners (disqualified 11 legislators)… even though the order is the precise order which has been assailed by the petitioners through the instant writ petitions”. The interesting thing is that the legislators not only did not dispute the factual position before the court, but they even failed to challenge it in their replies to the Speaker, something that the judges remarked upon while dismissing the allegation of prejudice by the Speaker. The judges noted, “The factual position depicted in the disqualification petition filed was not disputed by the petitioners in their replies to the show cause notice issued to them by the Speaker of the Karnataka Legislative Assembly”.
The judges were equally dismissive of the disqualified MLAs’ contention that the Speaker had flouted the principles of natural justice in punishing them because he had acted in haste and not given them more time to prepare their defence. Moreover, they claimed, the Speaker had relied on material in his disqualification order that were not there in the show cause notice issued to them. While accepting that just three days had been given to respond, the Chief Justice, after giving “thoughtful consideration” to the issue, stated, “Since the procedure required to be followed (by the Speaker) under the rules of natural justice was admittedly followed, should the proceedings conducted by the Speaker… be set aside? I am of the view that the answer…has to be in the negative, because the procedure adopted has not resulted in any prejudice to the petitioners”.
In a helpful gesture, the Chief Justice ventured to elaborate on ‘natural justice’, saying it was a “flexible” concept. “The principles of natural justice cannot be placed in a straitjacket. There are flexible rules”, and they needed to be applied on a case to case basis.
As for the so-called additional material that the Speaker had relied on in his order but which were missing in the show cause letters, the court observed that the additional stuff was merely supplementary in nature comprising press clippings etc., and so had no great bearing on the final order. In any case, as the court pointed out, since the additional material supplemented the main factual position that had remained uncontested, the aggrieved parties had no cause to complain.
With the Speaker showing no mala fide intent and also meeting the rules of natural justice – even if in letter alone, allegations against the Speaker of procedural lapses do not stand scrutiny. The court observed that he had given the legislators time to respond and to even appear in person to clarify their position, before disqualifying them. The Chief Justice also set aside the contention that the Defection Rules had been violated by the Speaker. Quoting an earlier Supreme Court ruling, the Chief Justice stated, “Since Rules 6 and 7 of the Defection Rules have been held by the apex court to be directory in nature, it would not be possible for me, merely on account of the violations of the procedures envisaged under the aforesaid Rules, to set aside the (Speaker’s) order… unless the violation is shown to have resulted in prejudice to the petitioners”.
There have been cases in the past where the conduct of the legislators, who had neither quit their party nor joined another but had publicly rebelled like in the current one, was found fit for disqualification under the 10th Schedule. The Rajendra Singh Rana and others versus Swami Prasad Maurya and other in Uttar Pradesh, is a celebrated case in point. But the issue there had to contend with another factor – that of a split, which the BSP claimed had happened consequent to the letters it had dispatched to the Governor. After a long-winding legal battle that went right up, the Supreme Court in early 2007 pronounced the legislators disqualified under the anti-defection laws because the split could not be legally proved. But by then the political situation had completely ahead and the verdict held only academic value.
The third judge’s verdict on whether the 11 Karnataka legislators stand disqualified is the critical missing link in the current episode. Whatever be the outcome, one can safely assume it will be challenged by the aggrieved party in a higher court. It remains to be seen whether it will follow the UP trajectory or reach an early conclusion. In all this, let us also not forget that the fate of five Independent legislators, who too were disqualified by the Speaker, lies in the judiciary’s hands.
RAJESH SINGH
While the two Karnataka High Court judges who heard on October 18 the plea of the 11 state legislators disqualified by the Speaker under the anti-defection laws, differed on upholding the disqualification, they were unanimous in endorsing the Speaker on three significant grounds. One, the Speaker demonstrated no prejudice in passing the disqualification order; two, he had followed the principles of natural justice in arriving at the decision; and three, he had committed no procedural lapses in reaching his conclusion. These observations have effectively demolished the claims of dissident legislators that the Speaker was biased and had failed to comply with accepted procedures in ordering their disqualification.
What now remains to be settled is whether the conduct of these BJP legislators – dashing off a letter to the Governor withdrawing support to Chief Minister BS Yeddyurappa and openly hobnobbing with the opposition Congress and the JD (S) for several days – was sufficient reason for the Speaker to disqualify them under the 10th Schedule of the Constitution. Because one of the two judges, Chief Justice J S Khehar, found them so while Justice N Kumar did not concur with the opinion, a third judge is now engaged in deciding the matter. But, regardless of the outcome the fact will remain that the majority opinion has upheld the Speaker’s conduct in processing the case.
Dismissing charges of prejudice levelled by the disqualified legislators against the Speaker who gave them ‘just’ three days to respond to a show cause notice, Chief Justice Khehar (supported by Justice Kumar) pointed out that “although three days time was afforded to the petitioners to respond to the show cause notice, the petitioners filed detailed and exhaustive replies dealing not only with the factual aspect of the matter, but also of the nuances of the law involved in the controversy”. The inference is that, while the complainants quibbled over lack of adequate time to submit their defence, their replies, including “nuances” of the law that they quoted, did not show any suffering on this count.
It is clear from the court’s observations that the disqualified legislators worsened their case by not even disputing the findings of the Speaker – for example, having met the Governor and given him a letter withdrawing support to their party colleague and Chief Minister – that was there in the show cause notice and proved pivotal to their disqualification. The High Court said, “The factual position depicted in the (Speaker’s) order, has not been disputed by the petitioners (disqualified 11 legislators)… even though the order is the precise order which has been assailed by the petitioners through the instant writ petitions”. The interesting thing is that the legislators not only did not dispute the factual position before the court, but they even failed to challenge it in their replies to the Speaker, something that the judges remarked upon while dismissing the allegation of prejudice by the Speaker. The judges noted, “The factual position depicted in the disqualification petition filed was not disputed by the petitioners in their replies to the show cause notice issued to them by the Speaker of the Karnataka Legislative Assembly”.
The judges were equally dismissive of the disqualified MLAs’ contention that the Speaker had flouted the principles of natural justice in punishing them because he had acted in haste and not given them more time to prepare their defence. Moreover, they claimed, the Speaker had relied on material in his disqualification order that were not there in the show cause notice issued to them. While accepting that just three days had been given to respond, the Chief Justice, after giving “thoughtful consideration” to the issue, stated, “Since the procedure required to be followed (by the Speaker) under the rules of natural justice was admittedly followed, should the proceedings conducted by the Speaker… be set aside? I am of the view that the answer…has to be in the negative, because the procedure adopted has not resulted in any prejudice to the petitioners”.
In a helpful gesture, the Chief Justice ventured to elaborate on ‘natural justice’, saying it was a “flexible” concept. “The principles of natural justice cannot be placed in a straitjacket. There are flexible rules”, and they needed to be applied on a case to case basis.
As for the so-called additional material that the Speaker had relied on in his order but which were missing in the show cause letters, the court observed that the additional stuff was merely supplementary in nature comprising press clippings etc., and so had no great bearing on the final order. In any case, as the court pointed out, since the additional material supplemented the main factual position that had remained uncontested, the aggrieved parties had no cause to complain.
With the Speaker showing no mala fide intent and also meeting the rules of natural justice – even if in letter alone, allegations against the Speaker of procedural lapses do not stand scrutiny. The court observed that he had given the legislators time to respond and to even appear in person to clarify their position, before disqualifying them. The Chief Justice also set aside the contention that the Defection Rules had been violated by the Speaker. Quoting an earlier Supreme Court ruling, the Chief Justice stated, “Since Rules 6 and 7 of the Defection Rules have been held by the apex court to be directory in nature, it would not be possible for me, merely on account of the violations of the procedures envisaged under the aforesaid Rules, to set aside the (Speaker’s) order… unless the violation is shown to have resulted in prejudice to the petitioners”.
There have been cases in the past where the conduct of the legislators, who had neither quit their party nor joined another but had publicly rebelled like in the current one, was found fit for disqualification under the 10th Schedule. The Rajendra Singh Rana and others versus Swami Prasad Maurya and other in Uttar Pradesh, is a celebrated case in point. But the issue there had to contend with another factor – that of a split, which the BSP claimed had happened consequent to the letters it had dispatched to the Governor. After a long-winding legal battle that went right up, the Supreme Court in early 2007 pronounced the legislators disqualified under the anti-defection laws because the split could not be legally proved. But by then the political situation had completely ahead and the verdict held only academic value.
The third judge’s verdict on whether the 11 Karnataka legislators stand disqualified is the critical missing link in the current episode. Whatever be the outcome, one can safely assume it will be challenged by the aggrieved party in a higher court. It remains to be seen whether it will follow the UP trajectory or reach an early conclusion. In all this, let us also not forget that the fate of five Independent legislators, who too were disqualified by the Speaker, lies in the judiciary’s hands.
Friday, September 24, 2010
RAJESH SINGH
The Armed Forces Special Powers Act 1958 was never meant to be a soft legislation that would deal with routine law and order problems. This much is accepted by even the worst critics of the Act. So, why is there such opposition to its stringent provisions? The answer to that depends on who you are. If you are a separatist, you cry foul because the law strikes you like a sledgehammer and seriously hampers your campaign to spread hatred and secessionism. The human rights activists — including non-governmental organisations and some lawyers as well — find in the Act a reason to hit out at the Armed Forces and indoctrinate their audience into believing that the forces are there to just plunder, humiliate and kill. If you happen to be a politician, the AFSPA comes in handy to camouflage your blunders that are in the first place responsible for the situation that demanded invocation of the legislation. In all cases, the Armed Forces become the scapegoat.
To understand the extent to which critics can go in aborting a measure that is designed to help combat internal aggression that threatens the country’s very integrity, one needs to revisit a development that happened 14 years ago and has been commented upon extensively. Through a bunch of writs, some petitioners, including the Naga People’s Movement of Human Rights, represented by established lawyers, challenged the Act in the Supreme Court on two major premises: One; Parliament had no legislative competence to enact AFSPA and, two; the provisions of the Act were either unnecessary or too sweeping without checks and balances.
A third point that arose as a corollary is most interesting: Suggestions were offered that the Union Government could impose Emergency in ‘disturbed’ regions rather than set the trouble right through judicious use of the Armed Forces. Some truly outlandish arguments were offered, all of which were mercifully trashed by a five-member Constitution Bench of the apex court. Now, when the demand for scrapping, diluting or revoking the Act has gathered renewed momentum following the unfortunate violence in the Kashmir Valley, the apex court’s observations are more relevant than ever.
One of the grounds the opponents of the Act offer is that the legislation is “draconian” and “inhumane” because it vests extreme powers in the Armed Forces to arrest suspected extremists, raod hideouts and seize arms and ammunition, all the while enjoying immunity from legal scrutiny. This is not entirely factual, but we shall leave it at that for the moment and concentrate on the options that the petitioners who approached the apex court suggested. Even a quick reading of the landmark apex court judgement of 1997 leads one to the conclusion that the upholders of humanity and anti-draconianism had actually suggested that the Union Government should have considered invoking Article 352 that deals with the imposition of Emergency, rather than resort to invoking AFSPA.
They also contended that the Union Government had bypassed yet another option: Invocation of Article 356 of the Constitution that facilitates summary dismissal of a State Government and imposition of President’s rule. In other words, the petitioners seemed to have no problem with the repression and loss of various civil rights that an Emergency would entail, but they had issues with the Armed Forces Special Powers Act.
The Supreme Court was, of course, not impressed by this argument. But before it dismissed the twin contentions as lacking in “substance”, it dwelt upon the positions taken by the petitioners, represented among others by then senior advocate and now Cabinet Minister Kapil Sibal who felt that Articles 352 or 356 would have served the purpose since the menace was one of “armed rebellion”. The Justices observed, “Shri Sibal has urged that the Central Act was enacted to deal with a disturbed or dangerous condition which is no less than armed rebellion and the Parliament is seeking to bypass Article 352 or Article 356 of the Constitution and the Central Act is, therefore, unconstitutional”.
This was rightly countered by then Attorney-General Ashok Desai, who pointed out that the proclamation of Emergency had greater consequences and could seriously impact the legislative and executive powers of the state. In contrast, he added, the powers under AFSPA were limited in nature. Underlining its opposition to needless imposition of such strong provisions, the court said, “If the situation can be handled by deployment of Armed Forces of the Union in the disturbed area, there appears to be no reason why the drastic power under Article 352 should be invoked”.
On the wisdom of imposing Article 356 instead of having invoked AFSPA, the court was as categorical in its rejection, pointing out that, while AFSPA ensures that legislative and executive powers remain with the State, imposition of Article 356 would vest all powers with the Union Government, a decidedly less attractive option. The Justices stated, “We are unable to appreciate how the enactment of the Central Act (AFSPA) can be equated with the exercise of the power under Article 356 of the Constitution”.
The issue is also one that goes beyond the silly attempt at such an equation. It knocks the bottom off the argument that opponents of the Act forward: Because AFSPA is so central in nature and intrudes upon the daily lives of citizens, it is alienating the people of the region it operates in. If this alienates the people, what about Article 356 through which the Union Government rules a State, and which negates the concept of elected Government?
In all this legalese, one must not lose sight of the fact that the learned advocates through their petitioners consistently argued for the imposition of provisions that were clearly more stringent than those provided by AFSPA, all the while questioning first the legality of the legislation and then the legitimate powers it gave to the Armed Forces to act in disturbed areas.
The hollow contention of the petitioners was exposed on another ground when they ranted against provisions of Section 6 of the Act, which they claimed provided legal immunity to those (the Armed Forces personnel) who exercised the powers granted by the Act. This is an issue that continues to raise a storm, with opponents of AFSPA alleging that the Army was acting like despots in “disturbed” regions, rounding up people and humiliating them and their family members, knowing they cannot be punished. The court rubbished the claim, saying, “It has to be borne in mind that a discretionary power is not necessarily a discriminatory power and that abuse of power is not to be easily assumed where discretion is vested in the Government and not in a minor official.”
But, look at how easily our AFSPA-bashers assume that the Act provides discriminatory powers to the Armed Forces. They refuse to take cognisance of the fact that armed personnel in disturbed areas need permission from a civilian officer such as the magistrate or a military officer to undertake any punitive action like search, seizure and arrest. They have to work under a list of uncompromising do’s and don’ts. And, while it is true that their actions per se cannot be challenged in a court of law, if any wrong-doing on their part is established by a probe, they can be punished. The court observed, “We are of the view that since the order of the Union Government refusing or granting sanction under Section 6 is subject to judicial review, the Union Government shall pass an order giving reasons”. This effectively means that an aggrieved party can approach the courts against the Union Government’s decision to order, or not order, a probe against security personnel functioning under AFSPA provisions. So, where is the immunity except in field operations?
The Armed Forces Special Powers Act 1958 was never meant to be a soft legislation that would deal with routine law and order problems. This much is accepted by even the worst critics of the Act. So, why is there such opposition to its stringent provisions? The answer to that depends on who you are. If you are a separatist, you cry foul because the law strikes you like a sledgehammer and seriously hampers your campaign to spread hatred and secessionism. The human rights activists — including non-governmental organisations and some lawyers as well — find in the Act a reason to hit out at the Armed Forces and indoctrinate their audience into believing that the forces are there to just plunder, humiliate and kill. If you happen to be a politician, the AFSPA comes in handy to camouflage your blunders that are in the first place responsible for the situation that demanded invocation of the legislation. In all cases, the Armed Forces become the scapegoat.
To understand the extent to which critics can go in aborting a measure that is designed to help combat internal aggression that threatens the country’s very integrity, one needs to revisit a development that happened 14 years ago and has been commented upon extensively. Through a bunch of writs, some petitioners, including the Naga People’s Movement of Human Rights, represented by established lawyers, challenged the Act in the Supreme Court on two major premises: One; Parliament had no legislative competence to enact AFSPA and, two; the provisions of the Act were either unnecessary or too sweeping without checks and balances.
A third point that arose as a corollary is most interesting: Suggestions were offered that the Union Government could impose Emergency in ‘disturbed’ regions rather than set the trouble right through judicious use of the Armed Forces. Some truly outlandish arguments were offered, all of which were mercifully trashed by a five-member Constitution Bench of the apex court. Now, when the demand for scrapping, diluting or revoking the Act has gathered renewed momentum following the unfortunate violence in the Kashmir Valley, the apex court’s observations are more relevant than ever.
One of the grounds the opponents of the Act offer is that the legislation is “draconian” and “inhumane” because it vests extreme powers in the Armed Forces to arrest suspected extremists, raod hideouts and seize arms and ammunition, all the while enjoying immunity from legal scrutiny. This is not entirely factual, but we shall leave it at that for the moment and concentrate on the options that the petitioners who approached the apex court suggested. Even a quick reading of the landmark apex court judgement of 1997 leads one to the conclusion that the upholders of humanity and anti-draconianism had actually suggested that the Union Government should have considered invoking Article 352 that deals with the imposition of Emergency, rather than resort to invoking AFSPA.
They also contended that the Union Government had bypassed yet another option: Invocation of Article 356 of the Constitution that facilitates summary dismissal of a State Government and imposition of President’s rule. In other words, the petitioners seemed to have no problem with the repression and loss of various civil rights that an Emergency would entail, but they had issues with the Armed Forces Special Powers Act.
The Supreme Court was, of course, not impressed by this argument. But before it dismissed the twin contentions as lacking in “substance”, it dwelt upon the positions taken by the petitioners, represented among others by then senior advocate and now Cabinet Minister Kapil Sibal who felt that Articles 352 or 356 would have served the purpose since the menace was one of “armed rebellion”. The Justices observed, “Shri Sibal has urged that the Central Act was enacted to deal with a disturbed or dangerous condition which is no less than armed rebellion and the Parliament is seeking to bypass Article 352 or Article 356 of the Constitution and the Central Act is, therefore, unconstitutional”.
This was rightly countered by then Attorney-General Ashok Desai, who pointed out that the proclamation of Emergency had greater consequences and could seriously impact the legislative and executive powers of the state. In contrast, he added, the powers under AFSPA were limited in nature. Underlining its opposition to needless imposition of such strong provisions, the court said, “If the situation can be handled by deployment of Armed Forces of the Union in the disturbed area, there appears to be no reason why the drastic power under Article 352 should be invoked”.
On the wisdom of imposing Article 356 instead of having invoked AFSPA, the court was as categorical in its rejection, pointing out that, while AFSPA ensures that legislative and executive powers remain with the State, imposition of Article 356 would vest all powers with the Union Government, a decidedly less attractive option. The Justices stated, “We are unable to appreciate how the enactment of the Central Act (AFSPA) can be equated with the exercise of the power under Article 356 of the Constitution”.
The issue is also one that goes beyond the silly attempt at such an equation. It knocks the bottom off the argument that opponents of the Act forward: Because AFSPA is so central in nature and intrudes upon the daily lives of citizens, it is alienating the people of the region it operates in. If this alienates the people, what about Article 356 through which the Union Government rules a State, and which negates the concept of elected Government?
In all this legalese, one must not lose sight of the fact that the learned advocates through their petitioners consistently argued for the imposition of provisions that were clearly more stringent than those provided by AFSPA, all the while questioning first the legality of the legislation and then the legitimate powers it gave to the Armed Forces to act in disturbed areas.
The hollow contention of the petitioners was exposed on another ground when they ranted against provisions of Section 6 of the Act, which they claimed provided legal immunity to those (the Armed Forces personnel) who exercised the powers granted by the Act. This is an issue that continues to raise a storm, with opponents of AFSPA alleging that the Army was acting like despots in “disturbed” regions, rounding up people and humiliating them and their family members, knowing they cannot be punished. The court rubbished the claim, saying, “It has to be borne in mind that a discretionary power is not necessarily a discriminatory power and that abuse of power is not to be easily assumed where discretion is vested in the Government and not in a minor official.”
But, look at how easily our AFSPA-bashers assume that the Act provides discriminatory powers to the Armed Forces. They refuse to take cognisance of the fact that armed personnel in disturbed areas need permission from a civilian officer such as the magistrate or a military officer to undertake any punitive action like search, seizure and arrest. They have to work under a list of uncompromising do’s and don’ts. And, while it is true that their actions per se cannot be challenged in a court of law, if any wrong-doing on their part is established by a probe, they can be punished. The court observed, “We are of the view that since the order of the Union Government refusing or granting sanction under Section 6 is subject to judicial review, the Union Government shall pass an order giving reasons”. This effectively means that an aggrieved party can approach the courts against the Union Government’s decision to order, or not order, a probe against security personnel functioning under AFSPA provisions. So, where is the immunity except in field operations?
Tuesday, August 31, 2010
Sheila, Sheila all the way
Capital Phenomenon
A Political History of Delhi: 1998-2009
By Sidharth Mishra
Allied Publishers Pvt Ltd
Rs 250/-
Rajesh Singh
At first glance, the cover of the book is a bit mystifying. It promises us a political history of Delhi covering the period 1998-2009, but the blurb on the front flap reduces the scope to the rise and rise of Sheila Dikshit. But then, since no objective analyst can deny the pivotal role she has played in the capital region’s politics, whether it is in keeping the BJP at bay or decimating her rivals within the party, perhaps equating the history of the state over the ten years to the Chief Minister’s personal and political charisma is not such a brazen attempt at eulogy. What makes her even more enigmatic is the manner she has trumped her foes. To borrow a recent phrase of a US official, she has used the scalpel rather than the hammer to floor them, thus escaping the charge of indulging in ruthless politics. That she has become a capital phenomenon, even her adversaries do not deny. What they wish is that the phenomenon ends soon.
Besides projecting Sheila Dikshit’s prowess, the book also serves as a useful reference guide to those interested in Delhi’s politics. Since it is a collection of articles from a column that author Sidharth Mishra has been writing for The Pioneer, it takes the reader to events and people that may now be fading from public memory but are useful to remember for a closer political understanding. The common thread that runs through the collection is an attempt to unravel the Chief Minister’s brand of politics. Interestingly, the author supplements his effort more by quoting instances of how she has over the decade managed to counter opposition from within her own party. It does appear from the book that she faced larger challenges from within than from the opposition. It is a reflection both on how easily the BJP appears to have caved in to her charms and the desperation of local Congress leaders who, with her continued rise, feel more and more marginalized.
Mishra has an interesting observation to make: that Sheila Dikshit gave Delhi to the Congress at a time when party stalwarts elsewhere like Ashok Gehlot and Digvijaya Singh were falling by the wayside and the NDA was on the rise. From taking over for the first time as Chief Minister in 1998 to 2004 by when she had effectively consolidated her hold, the BJP and its allies were on the upswing. As the author says in an article of April 2004, “Last December, when four states went to poll, three ousted the Congress but Delhi retained the Sheila Dikshit-led government”. The achievement becomes even more remarkable when one remembers that just four years before that victory, she was down in the dumps with the Congress losing all the seven Delhi seats in the 1999 Lok Sabha elections. A lesser leader would have collapsed, but Sheila Dikshit emerged stronger from that debacle. In the 2004 parliamentary polls the party under her leadership won back six of the seven seats. The author, in all fairness, credited BJP’s V K Malhotra for his victory from South Delhi, for the “focused work” the veteran leader had put in.
Sheila Dikshit’s detractors may have been stumped by the revival but they were far from done. The author tells us how, even after scripting a grand success, she had to wait for over ten days before the party High Command named her the Chief Minister for a second term. Clearly, her rivals within the party worked overtime to deny her glory in victory. But here the reader is left asking for more. Mishra does not recreate the backstage drama that went on in a bid to deny her the chief ministership – the characters who played the villain and how they were finally overcome.
Mishra counts several more instances when the Chief Minister had to tackle covert and at time open rebellion to her leadership. In some cases, like when her detractor Subbash Chopra was made Delhi Pradesh Congress Committee president or when another opponent Rambabu Sharma was given much prominence, rumours were that the High Command itself was keen to clip her wings. Even high profile leaders like Jagdish Tytler and Ajay Maken, according to the author, are alleged to have played a part in the campaigns to denigrate her leadership.
So much so that, even some bureaucrats in the early days of her chief ministership caused her trouble by failing to follow orders. The author narrates the case of Omesh Saigal, who as Chief Secretary had been reportedly flouting government instructions. Ironically, she found relief under the NDA regime, when her demand for his transfer was promptly accepted by L K Advani who was then Home Minister in the NDA government at the Centre.
If Sheila Dikshit remained right on top despite all the rug-pulling, it was, Mishra says, because she had managed to strike a chord in the hearts of the average Delhi voter, who variously saw in her a dynamic leader, a sympathetic sister and an understanding mother. Despite her elderly woman status, she connected naturally with the younger generation, something that her opponents like M L Khurana failed to do. That is how, the author tells, she managed to project herself as a harbinger of “change in culture”. She spoke the language of development – something that the youth understood and appreciated, and in an interview to the author elaborated on the efforts to bring about a “cultural change in the city environment, administration and politics…Administration does not mean serving certain individuals. It should be for the people at large”.
The author devotes a major part of the book to underline that she succeeded despite various odds. There is no dispute with that. But something must have gone wrong for so many of her early supporters to turn against her. Even if conceding that some of them wanted to push an agenda that was unpalatable and she aborted such efforts, all of her detractors could not have been always wrong. The author could have also brought into focus her drawbacks.
So, far, despite all the scheming and plotting against her, Sheila Dikshit has had the last laugh. The last of these last laughs was when she led the party in Delhi to a resounding victory in the 2009 Lok Sabha elections, with the Congress sweeping all the seven seats. But, now she faces a huge challenge to her famed competence: the successful organisation of the Commonwealth Games. Her government is under the scanner for making a mess of Delhi in the garb of modernizing the civic amenities ahead of the games. Deadlines have gone by unmet and there is little evidence yet of her famed strong and decisive hand. Her political foes have been waiting for an opportunity to unmask her enigma. Will the Commonwealth Games provide that occasion? The author will be as eager as any one else for an answer.
END
A Political History of Delhi: 1998-2009
By Sidharth Mishra
Allied Publishers Pvt Ltd
Rs 250/-
Rajesh Singh
At first glance, the cover of the book is a bit mystifying. It promises us a political history of Delhi covering the period 1998-2009, but the blurb on the front flap reduces the scope to the rise and rise of Sheila Dikshit. But then, since no objective analyst can deny the pivotal role she has played in the capital region’s politics, whether it is in keeping the BJP at bay or decimating her rivals within the party, perhaps equating the history of the state over the ten years to the Chief Minister’s personal and political charisma is not such a brazen attempt at eulogy. What makes her even more enigmatic is the manner she has trumped her foes. To borrow a recent phrase of a US official, she has used the scalpel rather than the hammer to floor them, thus escaping the charge of indulging in ruthless politics. That she has become a capital phenomenon, even her adversaries do not deny. What they wish is that the phenomenon ends soon.
Besides projecting Sheila Dikshit’s prowess, the book also serves as a useful reference guide to those interested in Delhi’s politics. Since it is a collection of articles from a column that author Sidharth Mishra has been writing for The Pioneer, it takes the reader to events and people that may now be fading from public memory but are useful to remember for a closer political understanding. The common thread that runs through the collection is an attempt to unravel the Chief Minister’s brand of politics. Interestingly, the author supplements his effort more by quoting instances of how she has over the decade managed to counter opposition from within her own party. It does appear from the book that she faced larger challenges from within than from the opposition. It is a reflection both on how easily the BJP appears to have caved in to her charms and the desperation of local Congress leaders who, with her continued rise, feel more and more marginalized.
Mishra has an interesting observation to make: that Sheila Dikshit gave Delhi to the Congress at a time when party stalwarts elsewhere like Ashok Gehlot and Digvijaya Singh were falling by the wayside and the NDA was on the rise. From taking over for the first time as Chief Minister in 1998 to 2004 by when she had effectively consolidated her hold, the BJP and its allies were on the upswing. As the author says in an article of April 2004, “Last December, when four states went to poll, three ousted the Congress but Delhi retained the Sheila Dikshit-led government”. The achievement becomes even more remarkable when one remembers that just four years before that victory, she was down in the dumps with the Congress losing all the seven Delhi seats in the 1999 Lok Sabha elections. A lesser leader would have collapsed, but Sheila Dikshit emerged stronger from that debacle. In the 2004 parliamentary polls the party under her leadership won back six of the seven seats. The author, in all fairness, credited BJP’s V K Malhotra for his victory from South Delhi, for the “focused work” the veteran leader had put in.
Sheila Dikshit’s detractors may have been stumped by the revival but they were far from done. The author tells us how, even after scripting a grand success, she had to wait for over ten days before the party High Command named her the Chief Minister for a second term. Clearly, her rivals within the party worked overtime to deny her glory in victory. But here the reader is left asking for more. Mishra does not recreate the backstage drama that went on in a bid to deny her the chief ministership – the characters who played the villain and how they were finally overcome.
Mishra counts several more instances when the Chief Minister had to tackle covert and at time open rebellion to her leadership. In some cases, like when her detractor Subbash Chopra was made Delhi Pradesh Congress Committee president or when another opponent Rambabu Sharma was given much prominence, rumours were that the High Command itself was keen to clip her wings. Even high profile leaders like Jagdish Tytler and Ajay Maken, according to the author, are alleged to have played a part in the campaigns to denigrate her leadership.
So much so that, even some bureaucrats in the early days of her chief ministership caused her trouble by failing to follow orders. The author narrates the case of Omesh Saigal, who as Chief Secretary had been reportedly flouting government instructions. Ironically, she found relief under the NDA regime, when her demand for his transfer was promptly accepted by L K Advani who was then Home Minister in the NDA government at the Centre.
If Sheila Dikshit remained right on top despite all the rug-pulling, it was, Mishra says, because she had managed to strike a chord in the hearts of the average Delhi voter, who variously saw in her a dynamic leader, a sympathetic sister and an understanding mother. Despite her elderly woman status, she connected naturally with the younger generation, something that her opponents like M L Khurana failed to do. That is how, the author tells, she managed to project herself as a harbinger of “change in culture”. She spoke the language of development – something that the youth understood and appreciated, and in an interview to the author elaborated on the efforts to bring about a “cultural change in the city environment, administration and politics…Administration does not mean serving certain individuals. It should be for the people at large”.
The author devotes a major part of the book to underline that she succeeded despite various odds. There is no dispute with that. But something must have gone wrong for so many of her early supporters to turn against her. Even if conceding that some of them wanted to push an agenda that was unpalatable and she aborted such efforts, all of her detractors could not have been always wrong. The author could have also brought into focus her drawbacks.
So, far, despite all the scheming and plotting against her, Sheila Dikshit has had the last laugh. The last of these last laughs was when she led the party in Delhi to a resounding victory in the 2009 Lok Sabha elections, with the Congress sweeping all the seven seats. But, now she faces a huge challenge to her famed competence: the successful organisation of the Commonwealth Games. Her government is under the scanner for making a mess of Delhi in the garb of modernizing the civic amenities ahead of the games. Deadlines have gone by unmet and there is little evidence yet of her famed strong and decisive hand. Her political foes have been waiting for an opportunity to unmask her enigma. Will the Commonwealth Games provide that occasion? The author will be as eager as any one else for an answer.
END
Monday, July 12, 2010
Nariman attracts, despite Bhopal controversy

Before Memory Fades
Fali S Nariman
Hay House
Rs 599/-
Rajesh Singh
Even great men have blots. It helps them remain human. None of us who admires and respects Fali Nariman would want him to be anything more than human. One of the country’s foremost and legendary legal experts, he is regarded with awe not just in legal circles but by the political class of all hues as well. But in his long and memorable career, he has taken decisions that came to be termed as controversial or inconsistent with his stated philosophy. Whip-lashed by friends and well-wishers, Nariman bore it all. Lesser men would have succumbed. He endured, as did his legend –despite the Bhopal gas leak issue.
Nariman has recently been in the news for two reasons: his admission that he might not have defended Union Carbide had the full impact of the tragedy been known to him then, and the release of his autobiography, Before Memory Fades, that deals in detail, among other things, with the subject.
Nariman reportedly told a television news channel recently that he had appeared for Union Carbide in the courts since it was just another case for him. But now he realized that it was more than a case – it was a tragedy. Implicit in his introspection is an acceptance that he had blundered in defending the US giant. The move to represent Union Carbide had stung friends like Professor Upendra Baxi.
But that is now. In the book, he is neither remorseful nor defensive. He quotes articles that he wrote in the foreign journal, Human Rights Tribune in 1992, and in Seminar in December 2004/February 2005, to explain his point of view. Interestingly, Nariman does not add anything fresh to these articles, excusing himself to the reader saying, “I would be indulging in what we lawyers call ‘special pleading’ if I add anything to what was published in these journals.” It may be that fatigue over having to repeatedly defend his stand or simply the fact that all that was needed to be said had been said in the two magazines, explains the reluctance.
Whatever the case may be, Nariman has been fair to all. He reproduces his own article, Baxi’s scathing response, his rejoinder and finally the distinguished academic’s somewhat more sober reply. While Nariman sticks to legalities in putting his point across and taunts Baxi’s emotionalism by commenting that “sentiment is a poor guide to decision making – but toxic torts do generate a great deal of it,’ Baxi dismisses the article as “elaborate apologia for the unconscionable settlement that he so assiduously actually promoted.”
In full flow after ridiculing Nariman on the issue of monetary settlement for victims, Baxi recalls the suppression during Emergency. “The Union Carbide Corporation, and its normative cohorts, now declare an even more perennial enduring state of emergency against the present Bhopal victims…”, he remarks rather dramatically.
The comparison must have angered Nariman who had sacrificed the post of Additional Solicitor General – that had made him relocate from Mumbai to Delhi – in protest against the Emergency. In a strongly worded rejoinder, he wrote, “I heard and saw Professor Baxi keep extolling its (Emergency) virtues in broadcasts to the nation – over Doordarshan. My family and I remember this as vividly as Baxi remembers my role in the Bhopal civil case.”
Baxi responded by accusing Nariman of “hitting below the belt.”
But it is not only the Bhopal case that raised questions. In March 1998, he declined an offer to take over as Attorney General of India. The reason, he says, is because he did not want to be “part of a BJP led government.” But he had no qualms in accepting the nomination to the Upper House from a BJP government. He completed his tenure of six years, and even the Gujarat riots could not move him to quit, although it must be said that in his intervention in the Rajya Sabha, he very forcefully presented his anger over the riots and the plight of the minorities in that state.
It is strange that while Nariman should devote so many pages to the Bhopal issue, he does not even mention a case that he himself so passionately argued and one that made national and international news and pitch-forked Swami Agnivesh in the limelight: the issue of bonded labour. As Arun Shourie – one of Nariman’s admirers – wrote in his book, Courts and Their Judgements, “F S Nariman, one of the country’s most distinguished lawyers, argued the case on behalf of the Bandhua Mukti Morcha with feeling and with his customary brilliance.” Apparently, the distinguished lawyer did not consider it important enough to deserve mention in his autobiography. One wishes he had, because it shows how the judiciary at times fails the underprivileged.
Nariman has been involved in some of the most path-breaking cases, even if at times in a minor capacity. He recounts with justifiable pride his role in the Golaknath case in which he appeared as a junior counsel in 1967 for a group of petitioners. But when the Kesavananda Bharati case came up six years later to decide on the correctness of the Golaknath judgement, he was already Additional Solicitor General. He did not appear for the government because he had represented the petitioners in the Golaknath case. Nariman thus had to contend with being on the sidelines in a judgement that redefined the role of the judiciary in upholding the basic features of the Constitution. The judgement said that, while no part of the Constitution was beyond amending powers of the government, the basic features of the Constitution could never be abrogated, even by a constitutional amendment.
The eminent jurist is careful in his evaluation of judges he has appeared before. He picks up just two for fulsome praise: Subba Rao and Krishna Iyer – the former for “single-handedly” taking on Parliament over interpretation of Article 31 of the Constitution, and Iyer for bringing a humanitarian touch to his rulings and being all the time “fearless.”
Nariman is disillusioned with the process of selection of judges to the higher judiciary. He is not happy with the Collegium system, which came in place to shut out the earlier process that gave the government a complete say in selection matters. He was not happy with the earlier system too, which is why he appeared on behalf of the petitioner, Supreme Court Advocate-on-Record Association, in what is now famously known as the Second Judges Case.
The Supreme Court, having as example the havoc caused by A N Ray as Chief Justice – who during the Emergency indulged in large scale punitive transfer of high court judges – decided not to vest all powers of selection with the Chief Justice of India (CJI), but made it mandatory that the CJI consult (then) two of his senior-most colleagues. A collective opinion would thus prevail.
Nariman had won the case. The government would not have primacy over selection of judges to the higher judiciary. Even better, the Collegium of judges would keep a check on a truant CJI as well.
But Nariman believes things have not worked out as envisaged. “…the extra-curricular task (imposed upon five senior-most judges by a judgment of the court itself), that of recommending appointments to the highest court, has not been conducted with the care and caution that it deserves. There is too much ad hocism, and no consistent and transparent process of selection.”
It is a case, he says, he wished he had lost. Had that happened, the government would have retained its supremacy, and who knows, things could have been worse. One A N Ray was bad enough – imagine governments inundating the judiciary with several such Rays!
Thursday, June 24, 2010
For 20 years, Govts failed to act

Rajesh Singh
SUPREME COURT GAVE ROADMAP FOR SPEEDY
COMPENSATIONS BUT
SUCCESSIVE LEADERSHIPS NEVER
LEGISLATED ON THE MATTER
Although the Centre, stung by charges of complicity and inaction, is now moving swiftly to provide additional monetary compensation to the Bhopal gas victims, for over two decades various governments sat on key recommendations of the Supreme Court that provide for speedy compensation and relief to victims of industrial disasters. Noted jurist Fali Nariman in his recently released autobiography, Before Memory Fades, notes, “It is sad to record that…not one of any of these recommendations have been implemented so far”. He also takes a dig at the NGOs for ignoring the issue. “No one – not even spirited NGOs seem to be interested in lobbying for enactment of new laws as suggested by the court”.
Nariman, who devotes an entire section of the book to the Bhopal tragedy, points out to a set of Apex Court recommendations made on December 22, 1989 – five years after the event happened – that called for new legislation to ensure that victims of such tragedies were compensated immediately and did not get entangled in the web of legalese for years as they waited for their monetary due. While upholding the validity of the Bhopal Gas Leak Disaster (Processing of Claims) Act, 1985, a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court said that the Centre should insist that corporations seeking to establish hazardous industries first created a fund before they were issued licences. The money from the fund would be used to promptly compensate victims.
Nariman, who was roundly condemned by human rights activists and some legal experts for having represented Union Carbide Corporation in the disaster case, brushes aside the criticism with characteristic aplomb: “Sentiment is a poor guide to decision making – but toxic torts do generate a great deal of it.” In the book, he seeks to channel the anger reflected in populist demands to the task of ensuring that concrete steps are taken to tackle such disasters in future. The Apex Court, he says, laid down five crucial suggestions to prevent the recurrence of more Bhopals. These, had they been legislated, could have even helped the Bhopal gas leak victims.
One, the basis for damages should be statutorily fixed taking into consideration the nature of damage, its consequences and the capacity of parties to pay. The proposed law should also provide for deterrent or punitive damages. “This is vital for the future”, the Supreme Court remarked – twenty years ago.
Two, laws should be framed for extending interim relief to victims during the pendency of proceedings. This would, at least, reduce the agony of the victims, and is important since interim relief in such cases has been difficult to come by through existing laws.
Three, a law should provide for the establishment of tribunals to determine compensation. The aggrieved industry can challenge the Tribunal’s decision in the Supreme Court, but only after depositing the compensation amount determined by the Tribunal.
Four, a statutory permanent ‘Industrial Disaster fund’ should be created, to which the government and industries, whether public or private, could contribute. The Fund would be used to extend immediate monetary relief to victims.
And five, the “antiquated” Fatal Accidents Act, 1885, should be either drastically amended or replaced with a fresh Act to ensure, besides other things, payment of a fixed minimum compensation on ‘no fault liability’ basis and a provision requiring industrial concerns engaged in hazardous activities to take out a compulsory insurance against third party risks.
Nariman says in the book that, barring the third party insurance suggestion, none has been so far implemented. He is clearly of the view that an early and fair settlement of monetary compensation is one tangible way of delivering justice, since establishment of criminal liability is a long drawn process and may or may not bear fruit.
He explains how within the existing legal framework distribution of compensation money was delayed, either through political intransigence or by the obstacles perhaps unwittingly placed in the way by well-meaning non-governmental organizations. He offers some instances: the Madhya Pradesh High Court on April 4, 1988, modifying a District Court’s order, passed a decree for interim damages to the tune of 2500 million rupees. But, while Union Carbide (perhaps satisfied with the amount) did not challenge the decree, the Centre made no attempt to execute the order that would have – twenty years ago – placed some money in the hands of the victims and their families.
Nariman provides another example. Even as hearing on the above suit continued in Bhopal, the trial of suit could not begin even more than a year and half after the suit was filed, on the technical ground that the Union of India resisted an order for ‘mutual discovery of documents’. In other words, compensation distribution was further delayed.
The eminent jurist further writes that the matter got compounded with the protests by gas victim organizations and individuals, who filed review and writ petitions in the Supreme Court contesting the settlement. Frustrated by the delays in disbursement, Chief Justice of India, Ranganath Mishra in his October 3, 1991 order, scathingly observed:
“It may be right that some people challenging the settlement who have come before the court are the real victims. I assume that they are innocent and unaware of this rigmarole of the legal process. They have been led into a situation without appreciating their own interest. This would not be the first instance where people with nothing at stake have traded in the misery of others”.
(Published in The Pioneer on June 24, 2010)
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