Tuesday, April 26, 2011

Sideshows mar anti-corruption drive

BY RAJESH SINGH

The ongoing controversy over the Lok Pal Bill has centered around two issues: The method adopted by social activist Anna Hazare to have a say in the drafting of the anti-corruption legislation and the credentials of his nominees on the panel that is responsible for drafting the Bill. Let us for a moment keep aside the first aspect and concentrate on the other because that is what has captured the headlines of the television channels and newspapers. Certain people have raised doubts over the credibility of Anna Hazare’s people. The obvious question that arises out of this is: What are the credentials of the people levelling the charge? This needs to be understood because those making the allegation have to be above board themselves — ironically, this is the argument that Anna Hazare’s detractors have proposed in condemning the inclusion of the civil society panel members.

Leading the critics’ pack is the senior Congress leader, Mr Digvijaya Singh. He has targeted a panel member, Mr Shanti Bhushan because the former Union Law Minister has been supposedly caught on tape striking a deal with Samajwadi Party chief Mulayam Singh Yadav. Regardless of the fact that the authenticity of the tape has been contested and the final word is yet to be said, Mr Singh continues to berate the veteran lawyer.

As if that is not enough, he took on another member, the Karnataka Lokayukta, Mr Santosh Hegde — one who commands far greater credibility than Mr Singh ever did in his long political career. The Congress leader believes Mr Hegde has done more talking than acting as the Lokayukta — in other words, he has not acted against the BJP Chief Minister of the State. So, it all boils down to politics, is it not, Mr Singh? He seems to have forgotten that given the legal confines, Mr Hegde has performed admirably and has succeeded in maintaining the spotlight on corruption high places in Karnataka.

For sometime now, the Congress leader has been on a spree, making irresponsible statements and damaging his credibility further with each one of them. So much so, that few even within his own party take him seriously. He questioned the Batla House encounter — in the process belittling the sacrifice of a police officer who took on the terrorists; he ridiculed the Union Government’s policy towards combating the Maoists and spoke passionately for the Red ultras who mindlessly kill innocents and damage Government property; he made fun of the Union Minister for Home Affairs, Mr P Chidambaram and called him “intellectually arrogant”; he raised doubts over the Samjhauta blast case, providing a handle to Pakistan to up the ante against India.

Why then should his criticism hold credibility? A few days ago, a Madhya Pradesh court directed that Mr Singh be charge-sheeted over irregularities in a case involving a shopping mall project in the State. He may well protest innocence, but so have his targets. If the Congress leader is mired in allegations, how can he challenge the credentials of others? He has acquired a larger than life image because the electronic media, always looking for juicy comments, latches on to every silly word that he utters, and also because he has got away with his irresponsible conduct due to the Congress High Command’s blessings.

The other principal player in the campaign to discredit the panel’s non-Government members is Mr Amar Singh. If there is to be a list of the country’s most discredited politicians, the obstreperous former Samajwadi Party leader will surely figure among the top entrants. His constant flip flops, his willingness to align with any one or discard any one purely for personal gains, and a complete absence of a political conscience are his hallmarks. If there are rumours that the tapes allegedly implicating Mr Bhushan have been ‘sponsored’ by him, it is because he has that sort of a sordid reputation. Again, we do not know the truth behind that charge, but the allegation lends itself to the possibility that it is plausible. After all, the alleged taped conversation happened way back in 2006, and it could not have suddenly come out into the open without somebody’s orchestrated attempt.

The Samajwadi Party had dumped Mr Singh after it alarmingly realised that he had led it to the brink of disaster and discredit. How amusing that a person who openly admits to have lured (with chocolates or something as innocuous?) Opposition party legislators in the Uttar Pradesh Assembly to the SP, should be demanding the resignation of others on the ground of propriety!

Besides these two great political warriors for probity in public life, we have had fringe players doing their bit to discredit the civil society panel members — and, wonder of wonders, they belong to ‘civil society’ itself. So, what has angered them, and how credible are they? Take Ms Medha Patkar’s case. The anti-Narmada dam activist shared the dais with Anna Hazare at Jantar Mantar in New Delhi, but a few days later turned dissenter, asking the social activist to choose his friends carefully. She also admonished him for not consulting the larger civil society in conducting his campaign. Another similar critic emerged from the tinsel town in Mumbai — the super secularist film maker Mahesh Bhatt, who ranted over Anna Hazare’s ‘authoritarian’ attitude. Both these reactions emerged after the social activist let slip his admiration for the role of Mr Narendra Modi in promoting rural development in the State. It is not a coincidence that both Mahesh Bhatt and Medha Patkar are among the Gujarat Chief Minister’s most bitter critics — with their hate blinding them to any kind of objective assessment that brings out Mr Modi in good light. Their response also demonstrates their willingness to subordinate the larger cause of corruption in public life to their parochial agenda.

Soon after, a whisper campaign was initiated by people who have blatantly played the minority card for political and personal gains that Anna Hazare is actually an RSS man in disguise. After all, what better way is there than this to dent the solidarity among the non-Government members of the anti-corruption Bill panel! We will have to wait and see if the smear campaign eventually achieves its real goal — that of derailing the process of tightening the noose around corrupt public servants.

Tuesday, March 8, 2011

Who will guard the guardians?

RAJESH SINGH


(First appeared in The Pioneer dated March 08, 2011)

In the disgraceful PJ Thomas episode, what has gone largely unnoticed is the dubious role the Central Vigilance Commission played as an institution in facilitating the elevation of the now displaced IAS officer. This happened before he became the Central Vigilance Commissioner, and much earlier to the Supreme Court’s landmark verdict of March 3 that set aside Mr Thomas’ appointment as non-est – an appointment that never happened. A reading of the judgement – that ranks as among the most significant verdicts of the apex court since Independence – clearly establishes the flip-flops of the Commission on the matter that was used by both the Centre and Mr Thomas to project their righteousness.

On February 18, 2003, the Department of Personnel and Training referred the matter of sanctioning Mr Thomas’ prosecution in the palmolein oil import case to the Central Vigilance Commission. Less than four months later on June 3, 2003, the CVC responded, “Keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the case, the Commission would advise the Department of Personnel and Training to initiate major penalty proceedings against Mr P J Thomas…”

Nothing significant happened for four years after that, except that the governments changed both in Kerala and at New Delhi, and the matter of granting prosecution sanction remained in limbo. The central government remained ambivalent to pleas from the state on the matter. Meanwhile, the issue of empanelment of some officers including Mr Thomas to central services came up for consideration. On May 10, 2007, after persistent prodding by the Kerala government, the central regime wrote to the CVC seeking an opinion whether the pendency of response from the central government on the request can come in the way of the empanelment.

Here, the Commission went beyond its brief to take a U-turn on its earlier stand that he should be proceeded against. As the apex court observed, “Rather than rendering the advice asked for, the CVC vide its letter dated June 25, 2007 informed the Ministry that no case is made out…”

The Commission went a step further and stated that the case against Mr Thomas “may be dropped and the matter be referred once again thereafter to the Commission so that vigilance clearance as sought for now can be recorded”. Two points need to be noted here: One, the CVC went out of its way to suggest dropping of charges, and two, it even offered a way out to the Centre by suggesting that, once the charges were dropped, the government could return to the Commission for vigilance clearance.

The Supreme Court took exception to this change in attitude when it stated, “Neither in the reply nor on the file, any reasons are available as to why the CVC had changed its earlier opinion/stand as conveyed to the Ministry (earlier on June 3).” But that was not the central government’s concern. The problem for it was that, despite the CVC’s convenient shift in position the central government still could not have its way because the Kerala government which had pressed the charges was in no mood to oblige.

But even that did not deter the UPA government. Fortified by the Commission’s “advise”, it empanelled Mr Thomas – by now the state’s Chief Secretary – to the central services. On October 6, 2008 the CVC gave him the vigilance clearance, ignoring not just its earlier stand but also the various observations made by the Department of Personnel and Training along the way. On this the apex court remarked, “From the files we find that there at least six notings of DoPT between June 26, 2000 and November 2, 2004 which has recommended initiation of penalty proceedings against Mr P J Thomas, and yet in the clearance given by CVC… there is no reference to (these) notings.”

The Commission’s remarkable vacillation and doubtful ignorance of the adversial remarks by the DoPT eventually cleared the way for Mr Thomas to enter the central services and later become the Central Vigilance Commissioner. It also led to his disgrace.

If the role of the CVC was questionable, the conduct of the Congress had been no less so. While it is well known that the Congress-led UPA government backed Mr Thomas all along in the Supreme Court battle, the support can be traced back to the early days when the IAS officer was charge-sheeted in the oil import case – a charge-sheet that stands to this day. It was a Congress government in Kerala that wrote to the DoPT in January 2005 saying it did not want sanction to prosecute Thomas. In fact, it sought withdrawal of an earlier request for sanction made by its predecessor, the Left Front government.

Again, in November 2005 the state government took the position that since the charges levelled against Mr Thomas were invalid, the case against him should be withdrawn and the request for sanction to prosecute him need not be pursued. The move would have been a success but for the will of the people of Kerala. In May 2006, the Left Front, which was swept to power replacing the Congress-led alliance, opened the case and asked the central government to proceed with according sanction for prosecution.

Now, New Delhi’s Congress-led government suddenly perked up. It demanded to know the grounds on which the state was seeking to revive the prosecution sanction request. Interestingly, it had sought no such clarification when the Congress government in the state had sought withdrawal of request to sanction the prosecution – a request that had been made by an earlier Left government. Also, the Congress-controlled regime at the centre had not demanded an explanation from the CVC as to why the agency had summarily given a clean chit to Mr Thomas when all it had been asked to do was to offer some technical advice.

Wednesday, March 2, 2011

Wasteful defence, ridiculous deflection

RAJESH SINGH

(First appeared in The Pioneer dated March 2, 2011)

It beats reason why the Prime Minister, Mr Manmohan Singh should continue to defend a telecom policy that has reduced his government to shame and ridicule. If the idea is to constantly remind the people that the policy is the creation of the NDA regime, and therefore, the NDA is to blame for all the subsequent ills, it has not worked. The policy was framed in 2001 when market conditions were substantially different from those of today. Corporate houses had then to be cajoled into providing services whose financial viability was yet to be tested. Today, with the market expanding and the demand for Law mobile phone services growing at a blistering pace there is a scramble for securing licences, with operators willing to pay huge sums as fees to get them. Surely, the policy ought to have been tweaked to exploit the situation and gain the maximum revenues for the public exchequer.

That apart, let us understand what the Prime Minister said in Parliament recently. He stated that the implementation of the policy had been faulty. In doing so, he has further implicated himself, because then Mr Singh presided over a government which wrongly executed the telecom policy – even assuming for argument’s sake here that the policy was appropriate for the moment. What did he do about it? He cannot say that he acted immediately after the matter came to light. The Pioneer was the first to report on the shady dealings in December 2008, and it went on unravel layer after layer of the scam in a series of reports thereafter all through 2009 and 2010. That in turn triggered a flurry of activity, with the Comptroller & Auditor General, Central Vigilance Commission, the Central Bureau of Investigation and the courts turning the heat on the government. Mr A Raja, who presided over the scam as Telecom Minister had to depart and was eventually arrested.

But, at least a year before The Pioneer launched its scathing expose the matter had come to Mr Singh’s notice. Besides the official correspondences involving the Telecom Ministry, the Law Ministry, the Finance Ministry and the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India in late 2007, that showed how the then Minister was manipulating the policy to favour a select few, the Prime Minister too had written to Mr Raja asking him to implement the policy in a fair and transparent manner. All of this is in the public domain now, as is the fact that Mr Singh took no action over the defective implementation. For the Prime Minister to now regret that the policy execution was faulty is meaningless, unless he squarely takes the responsibility for that.

Mr Singh also said that the government’s aim was to provide quality service to the largest number of people and not to maximize revenue. Interestingly, this is in keeping with the now discredited Mr Raja’s contention that his decisions had empowered the common man by making 2G services accessible at affordable rates. The argument is supposed to provide legitimacy to the decision of not auctioning the licences but distributing it at discretion. It goes like this: had the government auctioned the licences, the service providers would have had to pay a heavier price for getting them, and thus would have charged the consumer more for the services they would provide. Why has the government then auctioned the 3G spectrum licences? Interestingly, despite having paid market price for 3G spectrum in competitive bidding, the service providers have rolled out the service at rates that are in some cases even lower than those of the 2G service providers.

The absence of bidding leads to – as it did in the 2G issue -- the cartelization of service providers, and that, the Prime Minister will agree, is not in the long-term interests of the consumer. Nor is such a development healthy for the country’s corporate sector, already beset by deep rivalries. In such a situation, the government’s intent also comes into question, because it is seen as favouring a select group of business houses at the cost of others. In the old times of licence-quota-permit system governments used to employ such tactics to extend their patronage to those they favoured and harm the ones they considered as ‘hostile’. Several high profile business clashes that hit the ordinary shareholders besides creating obstacles in the country’s economic growth, had their genesis in this sort of discretionary system.

Let us now return to the telecom policy itself, a policy that the central government has defended not so much because it likes it but because it wants to grill into the opposition that the policy is the NDA’s creation. Telecom Minister Kapil Sibal said in Parliament, with a smirk on the face, that the government had merely implemented the first-come-first-served provision of that policy.

There are two basic differences in the approach of the NDA government and that of the present one on the policy. During the NDA regime, the first-come-first served provision was implemented in letter and in spirit. Secondly, every major decision was vetted and cleared by the Cabinet. But in the UPA’s case, Mr Raja handpicked applicants and helped them jump the queue by various means such as arbitrarily advancing the cut-off date for submitting applications along with the necessary fee, which ran into several crores of rupees. Caught off guard, several legitimate applicants were stranded for time and cash, and thus eliminated. Messrs Singh and Sibal must, therefore, stop indulging in illogical analogies and concentrate on stemming the rot.

Friday, February 25, 2011

Prime Minister tries but fails to convince


RAJESH SINGH

Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in his structured interaction with television journalists recently justified his inaction on the massive irregularities in the allotment of 2G spectrum on the ground that neither the Union Finance Ministry nor the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India – not even the Telecom Ministry – had objected to the deal. He said, “If the Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Telecom both agree… and also that TRAI is an expert body; if all of them are of the same view, I did not feel I was in a position to insist on auctions.”

Of course, they were of the same view: that there was something wrong in the spectrum allotment and that corrective measures should be taken. The Prime Minister, therefore, should have insisted on auctions.

Interestingly, it was not just these organisations that had objected; even the Union Law Ministry had registered its protest over the manner in which the spectrum was being distributed by Mr Raja.

An overview of the developments that happened right under the Prime Minister’s benevolent gaze shatters the carefully constructed belief by Mr Singh’s spin masters, and now the Prime Minister himself, that he simply went by expert opinion and that he could not be held responsible for the presumptive loss to the public exchequer. Let us begin with the Law Ministry’s letter of November 1, 2007 to the Telecom Ministry – a missive that the Prime Minister very conveniently forgot to mention in his media interaction.

Then Law Minister H R Bhardwaj was perhaps the first senior Cabinet Minister to smell a rat. Apparently upset by the methodology adopted in allotting the spectrum, he wrote to the Telecom Ministry, “In view of the importance of the case (2G spectrum allocation) and various options indicated in the statement of the case, it is necessary that the whole issue is first considered by an Empowered Group of Ministers and, in that process, the legal opinion of A-G (Attorney General) can be obtained.”

The Law Minister was responding to an opinion sought by the Telecom Ministry on going ahead with the allocation of 2G spectrum licence on first-come-first-served basis and on prices fixed in 2001. An enraged Mr Raja wrote back – not to the Law Ministry but directly to the Prime Minister – questioning the idea of an EGoM to decide on spectrum pricing. He said in that letter, “The Ministry of Law and Justice, instead of examining the legal tenability of these alternative procedures, suggested referring the matter to EGoM. Since generally new major policy decisions of a department or inter-departmental issues are referred to the GoM, and needless to say that the present issues relate to procedures, the suggestion of the Law Ministry is totally out of context.”

This was on the morning of November 2, 2007. The same afternoon, the Prime Minister, perhaps alerted by Bhardwaj’s strong stand, wrote back to Mr Raja and cautioned him against taking any measures without informing him. “I would request you to give urgent consideration to the issues being raised with a view to ensuring fairness and transparency and let me know of the position before you take any further action in this regard,” Mr Singh directed his Minister. The Prime Minister also instructed him to adopt “correct pricing of spectrum and revision of entry fee”.

Thus, the Law Ministry registered its objection, Mr Raja dismissed it contemptuously, and the Prime Minister was all along in the loop. He did nothing. Towards the end of November the same year, came another shocker for the then Telecom Minister. The Finance Ministry got into the act, with then Finance Secretary D Subbarao sending a stinker to the Telecom Secretary on the issue. Mr Rao wrote, “It is not clear how the rate of Rs 1600 crore, determined as far back as in 2001, has been applied for a licence given in 2007… In view of the financial implications the Ministry of Finance should have been consulted in the matter before you finalised the deal.”

For good measure, Mr Subbarao added, “Meanwhile, all further action to implement the above licences may please be stopped.” The Finance Secretary was clearly expecting too much. Mr Raja had ignored the Prime Minister’s directive to adopt corrective pricing and revise entry fee; he was not going to be deterred by a Finance Secretary’s direction.

“If the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Telecom both agree…” – remember the Prime Minister’s clarification at the media interaction. Clearly the Finance Ministry had not agreed to the deal. Had then the Telecom Ministry agreed? We know that even it had not, if one goes by the assertions of senior Ministry officials. Neither then Telecom Secretary D S Mathur nor then Department of Telecom Member (Finance) Manju Madhvan was on the same page with Mr Raja. One had to leave in disgust while the other was swiftly replaced with then Minister’s yes-man after he retired. With senior officials in the Department of Telecom registering their protest to the deal, the only way to believe the Telecom Ministry was in agreement is to accept that Mr Raja alone was the Ministry.

And finally, was TRAI of the “same view” – as the Prime Minister asserted in his televised interaction? Of course it was not. Then TRAI chairman Nripendra Mishra had actually written to the Telecom Secretary Siddharth Behura – who had replaced Mr Mathur by then – objecting to the policy and the sudden revision of the cut-off date for submission of applications along with the requisite sum. When the government machinery went to town quoting a few statements of his that seemed to endorse the dubious methodology adopted, Mr Mishra went on record clarifying that his statements had been picked out of context. “Cherry picking”, is how he described it.

Thursday, February 17, 2011

Judges should not interpret every law and make them ineffective

(First published in The Pioneer dated February 17, 2011)

RAJESH SINGH

Barely days after exonerating a member of the outlawed United Liberation Front of Asom on the strange premise that being a member of a banned outfit did not make one criminal, Justices Markandey Katju and Gyan Sudha Mishra of the Supreme Court of India let off another ULFA member on a similar pretext. This time they offered the explanation that they had “read down” some provisions of the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act -- under which the accused had been tried -- because they seemed to violate the Constitution. The option before the Bench, they added, was to strike them down as unconstitutional. In other words, “reading them down” was a means to maintain the constitutional validity of the Act and yet remove the conflict the statute posed with the fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution.
On the face of it, the explanation makes eminent sense, and courts have been “reading down” provisions in the past through fresh interpretations. (Moreover, we should be grateful to the Bench that it did not strike down the ‘offending’ sections, a move that would have rendered all our anti-terrorist laws toothless.) But there are established guidelines for reading down statutes, and the mere supposed need to protect the constitutionality cannot be reason alone to conduct that exercise. Let us look at three such guidelines:

Reading down cannot be used to emasculate a statute or create confusion, making its workability difficult.

No reading down of a provision is permitted if that exercise makes it into a provision altogether different from what was intended by the legislature.

Reading down is adopted only when the statute is unworkable or cannot be enforced.

We may now turn to the provisions “read down” by the eminent judges, namely Section 10 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 and Section 3 (5) of TADA Act under which the earlier referred to ULFA member was tried. (Incidentally, the Justices also said that Section 124 (A) of the Indian Penal Code which deals with sedition must be read so that it conforms to the guaranteed fundamental rights. In other words, that too should be “read down, when occasion permits.)

Both Section 3 (5) of TADA and Section 10 of UAPA clearly lay down punishment for even mere membership of an outlawed organisation. There is nothing confusing in the provisions – if anything, they are so elaborately worded that they leave no scope for even the slightest doubt over interpretation. Because they are so carefully worded, there has never been any trouble over their implementation either. But the Bench decided to read them down anyway, creating in the process the very confusion the statutes sought to avoid, making them potentially unworkable. The introduction by the apex court judges of the concept of “passive” and “active” members of banned outfits, for instance, is a demarcation that the Legislature never intended to have – for in its scheme of things, all members of an unlawful organisation deserve some form of punishment. Now, the security and probe agencies will expend their energy in segregating the ‘active’ members from the ‘passive’, and the courts will indulge in hair-splitting exercises in deciding between the two.

Since “reading down” is employed as a tool for interpretation of statutes, we arrive at the question: When is the need to interpret real? Courts have settled the issue, and they have said that interpretation is required only where the statutes are ambiguous and, therefore, admit more than one interpretation. In case after case, our courts have underlined this basic rule. In Mithilesh Singh versus Union of India (2003) the Supreme Court stated that it was a presumption of interpretation of a statute that the Legislature inserted every word and expression for a definite purpose, and while interpreting no word can be rejected as being “inapposite or surplusage”. And, in the landmark Kartar Singh versus State of Punjab (1994) case, the apex court observed that the “object of interpreting a statute is to ascertain the intention of Legislature enacting it”.

The provisions of TADA and UAPA under debate – as indeed some others such as 124 (A) of the IPC and Section 6 of the Armed Forces Special Powers Act – are neither ambiguous nor do they encourage multiple interpretations. The object of the Legislature in making those provisions too is crystal clear. Yet, Justices Katju and Mishra thought it fit to interpret the statutes.

This brings us to the thumb rule for the interpretation of statutes: the doctrine of ‘harmonious construction’, which seeks to harmonise (or tone down) statues that are in apparent conflict with one another. The two-judge apex court Bench can claim that their act of reading down was to harmonise the sections of TADA and UAPA with the rights guaranteed under Articles 19 and 21 of the Constitution by adding clarity to the provisions, but even here the judges seem to have overlooked the basic principle laid down by the apex court itself, when it said, “Where the words of a statute are in themselves precise and unambiguous, no more is necessary than to expound these words in their natural and ordinary sense”.

And not just that, the court went on to add, “…where alternative constructions are equally open… that alternative is to be rejected which will introduce uncertainty, friction of confusion into the working of the system”.

Will not the interpretations by Justices Katju and Mishra and the creation of various kinds of memberships by them of banned outfits, lead to confusion? Will they not affect the policing and prosecuting systems? The answer is obvious.

Finally, while the Bench’s concern for upholding the Constitutional guarantees is praiseworthy, it is not as if anti-terror laws like UAPA (and the lapsed TADA) have been unconstitutional. While the UAPA is a much milder law, even the harsher TADA (and the earlier Prevention of Terrorism Activities Act) was upheld for its constitutionality, despite being forcefully challenged on occasions. In the People’s Union for Civil Liberties versus Union of India case (2004), the court, while upholding provisions of POTA, said, “To face terrorism we need new approaches, techniques, weapons, expertise and of course new laws.. It has become our obligation to pass necessary laws to fight terrorism.”

Similarly, on the validity of TADA, the apex court in Kartar Singh versus State of Punjab had largely upheld the various contentious provisions ranging from the matter of confessional statement before a police officer as admissible evidence in courts under Section 15 of the Act to the establishment of TADA designated courts and the appointment of judges to such courts, to remedies before an aggrieved person who feels his fundamental rights have been tampered with.

Thursday, February 10, 2011

A judgement that is worrisome

RAJESH SINGH

(First appeared in The Pioneer on February 9, 2010)

Justices Markandey Katju and Gyan Sudha Mishra have set a curious benchmark for members belonging to proscribed organisations. The learned judges of the Supreme Court of India have ruled that a mere membership of such outfits does not make one a criminal. To attract criminal proceedings, the member must indulge in or incite violence. This is great news for all the back office operators of banned groups, who until now faced action if caught, and bad news for investigating agencies and the central and state governments that are battling with the menace of extremism in various forms and at different levels. What is strange here is not just the verdict but the context in which the Justices pronounced it. Once we understand that, we will be able to better appreciate the needlessness of the ruling.

The case before the two member apex court Bench pertained to an appeal by one Arup Bhuyan who was convicted by a TADA court in March 2007 for being a member of the banned United Liberation Front of Assam. An aggrieved Bhuyan approached the Supreme Court contesting the conviction on the ground that he had confessed to being a member under duress. He claimed innocence saying he had nothing to do with the banned group. It must be remembered here that under Section 15 of the now-lapsed Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987, a confession made before the police was admissible evidence in a court, although under other laws such evidence is inadmissible under Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. Also, a member of a banned outfit attracted criminal action under Section 3 (5) of TADA merely for being a member.

Clearly then, the case of the accused rested on the single most important point: that the only concrete piece of evidence against him was the “forced” confessional statement where he implicated himself. The issue before the Justices too was that point alone.

So far so good. The Bench then went ballistic on how confessions before the police cannot be overly relied upon because “the widespread and rampant practice in the police in India is to use third degree methods for extracting confessions”. The Justices helpfully provided an explanation for such conduct: because the police are neither trained nor equipped to scientifically investigate cases they rely upon force to squeeze out confessions from reluctant accused.

They did not stop at that. Calling torture a “terrible thing”, the Bench observed that “when a person is under torture he will confess to almost any crime”. Therefore, it concluded, the courts should be “hesitant before they accept such extra-judicial confessional statements”.

All of this is true, and there is no dispute with the Justices on the points raised, even if one bears in mind that Bhuyan’s confessional statement – in whatever manner it was extracted – was admissible evidence since he was being tried under TADA. In the end, the Bench set aside the conviction and acquitted the accused not just because it held the confessional statement with suspicion, but also because the prosecution (state of Assam) could not provide corroborative evidence of guilt. And that is where the matter should have ended.

It did not. The Justices, now in full flow, decided to get hypothetical and use the power of assumption to pronounce a ruling that can have an implication beyond the context in which it was made. They had let off Bhuyan because his membership of the banned ULFA could not be established. But what if he had been a member, the court wondered, rather unnecessarily. “Even assuming he was a member of ULFA it has not been proved that he was an active member and not a mere passive member”, the Justices stated. The court had cleverly slipped in an aspect that was extraneous – and even irrelevant – to the case at hand: the active and the passive, something which no law of the land distinguishes between.

Going by the pronouncements of the Bench, an active member of a banned organisation is one who directly resorts to violence or incites violence. Every other member is passive and cannot be tried for criminal activity. This nuanced understanding flies in the face of existing provisions of the law. Take, for instance, Section 10 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, that is currently in force and deals with penalty for being a member of an unlawful association. It says, “Whoever is and continues to be a member of an association declared unlawful by a notification issued under Section 3 which has become effective under sub-Section (3) of that Section, or takes part in meetings of any such unlawful association, or contributes to, or receives or solicits any contribution for the purpose of any such unlawful association, or in any way assists the operations of any such unlawful association, shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to two years, and shall also be liable to fine.”

The provision clearly covers all members of an outfit declared unlawful by the central government through a notification, without categorizing such members as ‘active’ or ‘passive’.

Allowing so-called passive members to get away, the Justices have sought to dismiss the concept of ‘guilt by association’ by citing the example of a 1966 US Supreme Court decision. While we shall not go into the validity of the comparison, it must be emphasized here that provisions of UAPA rely on this doctrine, whether it is Section 10 referred to earlier or Section 7 that prohibits the use of funds of an unlawful association. The latter reads, “ Where an association has been declared unlawful…any person has custody of any monies, securities or credit which are being used or are intended to be used for the purpose of the unlawful association, the central government may… prohibit such person from paying, delivering, transferring or otherwise dealing in any manner” with such financial instruments.

Incidentally, in the matter of Section 7 too, the member does not directly indulge in violence or incite violence. Going by the apex court’s recent ruling, would a member involved in financial transactions of a banned outfit, get away?

Monday, January 10, 2011

Guilty? Blame the judge!

RAJESH SINGH

It required just one unfavourable verdict – and that too from a lower court – for the family and friends of convicted doctor-activist Binayak Sen to launch a bitter tirade against the Indian judiciary. Until the other day they were confident that the legal system would give them justice. For a number of people, the verdict of the Additional Sessions Court in Chhattisgarh was indeed justice; for Sen and his sympathizers it was travesty of that. The matter will now be debated in the High Court – where it has reached, and, if necessary, in the Supreme Court as well. But already the wife of the high-profile activist, sentenced for life on a variety of charges including sedition, has declared her loss of faith in the judiciary. So upset was she that she announced her desire to seek asylum in a “more democratic and liberal country”, but retracted the statement a few days later.

That Ms Ilina Sen should not have trust in one of the pillars of Indian democracy is eerily similar to the credo of the Maoists who reject the Indian establishment and seek to replace it through their brand of violence. The Red ultras also have contempt for the political and the judicial system. But the Sens have claimed to be part of the mainstream, working for the welfare of tribals, and so they should not have succumbed to the extremist conclusions. Damning the Chhattisgarh administrative and judicial mechanism, she now says her husband should have demanded that the trial be conducted outside that state. If she believes that would have offered her a better chance of justice, it is still not late to resort to that move. But no, like the Maoists she too concludes that it is useless to depend on a system that has, despite its faults, delivered for six decades since Independence. The appeal to the High Court, one would presume, is just going through the motions.

It remains a mystery why she expressed a desire to seek asylum. There have been no reported threats to her – although she claims to fear for her life – nor has she exhausted all the means of justice and arrived at a dead end where staying back would entail a dangerous existence. Incidentally, she forgets that Maoists, who have been termed as among the country’s greatest threats to internal security, continue to flourish, though occasionally some get eliminated. If they can fearlessly continue, why should Ms Sen, who self-admittedly has done nothing wrong, be worried? Of course, innocent people do get trapped, harassed, tortured and even prosecuted at times in the country, and that is unfortunate. But there are mechanisms to address such excesses, and they have been applied to correct wrongs in several instances. In any case, if every ‘wronged’ person comes to believe that asylum is the only way out, there would be an exodus from this country – and from any other nation as well, since even the most liberal and democratic country suffers from drawbacks.

Perhaps the asylum declaration was designed to embarrass the country before the rest of the world that has been lapping up the Binayak Sen case. There are enough human rights activists across the globe to project her despair as a monumental failing of rights record in India. With such a network of well-wishers, Ms Sen can well become an international celebrity at the cost of India’s image. One wonders, though, which “more liberal democratic country” she had planned to settle down in. The US, the UK? Well, look at how they have dealt with Mr Julian Assange of WikiLeaks, who had the courage to publish classified material that has shaken several nations. She had the option of the Gulf States, one of which has given refuge to noted painter M F Hussain, who fled India because he had no “creative freedom” to perform here. One needs to be an extraordinary person to market the idea that a Gulf nation offers more creative freedom than India.

Having ridiculed the judge who convicted Binayak Sen, the latter’s friends have turned their attention to the “archaic” provisions dealing with sedition and conspiracy against the government that nailed Sen. There have been of late a number of articles slamming Section 124 (A) of the Indian Penal Code on the ground that it had been promulgated by the British regime to stifle nationalist sentiments, and thus had no place in present times. While its continuation is a matter of healthy debate, it must be remembered that the country did adopt the provision in 1951 after it had been thoroughly discussed by our law makers. Their relevance was felt even sixty years ago; surely now, when the country is faced with several threats to internal security, they are not out of fashion.

Incidentally, the law on sedition was upheld by the Supreme Court in the landmark Kedarnath Singh versus State of Bihar case in 1962 – the very same case that is being parroted by sympathizers of the convicted activist to claim that Sen had been wronged. The apex court had said that under provisions of 124 (A) that deal with sedition, there could be reasonable restrictions to one’s freedom of speech as guaranteed by Article 19 of the Constitution. A Constitution Bench observed that the provisions “impose restrictions on the fundamental freedom of speech and expression, but those restrictions cannot but be said to be in the interests of public order and within the ambit of permissible legislative interference with that fundamental right.”

Elaborating on the apparent contradiction between the sedition law and the constitutional right to free speech or expression, the Bench had stated, “It is well settled that if certain provisions of law construed in one way would make them consistent with the Constitution, and another interpretation would render them unconstitutional, the court would lean in favour of the former construction. The provisions of the sections read as a whole… make it reasonably clear that the sections aim at rendering penal only such activities as would be intended, or have a tendency to create disorder or disturbance of public peace by resort to violence.”

All through the verdict, the learned justices took pains to explain why provisions of the law should not be read in isolation but should be considered in totality. In the Binayak Sen case, therefore, harping just on Article 19 that provides freedom of speech and expression without taking into account the restrictive measures of the constitutionally valid 124 (A), is bound to lead to lopsided conclusions.